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# BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 295. Trials of Leaders of Custod Turkish  
Regime Imminent
- 296. Patrice Lumumba
- 297. Voting Balance in UNGA - The New  
Members
- 298. 22nd CPSU Congress
- 299. Hungarian Violations of the 1947 Peace  
Treaty

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
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Immediately following the 27 May 1960 coup by the military Committee of National Unity in Turkey, led by General Cemal Gursel, a large number of members of the ousted regime were arrested. They were assembled as soon as possible and imprisoned on the small island of Yassi Ada on the Sea of Marmara just outside Istanbul. Among those incarcerated were the President, Celal Bayar, the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the Cabinet, the Chief of Staff, the Air Force chief, deputies, governors, mayors, and prefects. This was probably the first time in history that the entire leadership of a regime was thus imprisoned. The 38-man military Committee of National Unity quickly established a facade of returning power to civilians, while promising to retire from the forefront of the political scene and return to purely military duties as soon as possible. A predominately civilian government was nominated (headed by Gursel, who is President, Prime Minister, and still head of the military junta), and civilian commissions of eminent jurists and professors were set up not only to draw up a new constitution and electoral law, but also to prepare an indictment of the Bayar-Menderes regime, which, by establishing its essential illegality, would give legal justification for the revolutionary coup itself. It was made clear, at the same time, that there was to be no change in Turkey's foreign policy. Lurid charges, undoubtedly inspired by the Gursel group, such as the one that Menderes' police killed hundreds of students during the riots which preceded the coup or that bodies had been ground up for fertilizer or hidden in refrigerators, no doubt represent gross exaggeration. Probably, however, the Menderes regime was guilty of harsh repression of liberty (notably of the press), and of waste, dishonesty, and of general political (particularly electoral) shenanigans. The 65-year age limit for imposing the death penalty has been removed, an action which seems to have ex-President Bayar (who is 74) for its particular target. Despite its promises, however, the Gursel group has not pinpointed the date of the elections, which after several postponements now appear to be scheduled for the fall of 1961, neither a new constitution nor a revised electoral law has been produced and the trials of the Yassi Ada prisoners (for which there has been heavy preparation, especially for coverage by the press) have also been postponed more than once. There is a strong possibility, however, that they will be held in the near future.

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**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020011-8**

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Patrice Lumumba, deposed Premier and Minister of National Defense of the Republic of the (ex-Belgian) Congo, was born on 2 July 1925, in Kasai Province. After primary and secondary education, he went to work in Stanleyville, where he had had his limited schooling, as a postal clerk. At the age of 31 (only four years ago now) he was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to two years in prison. He was released by royal decree a year later and then shifted to the capital at Leopoldville, where he was employed in a brewery. He rose quickly to the position of sales manager but was released in April 1959 because he had been spending too much time in political activity, although there were rumors of his having embezzled in this position also. A notorious demagogue, he has great energy and ability to sway the masses. However, he has earned the distrust of other Congolese leaders and (partly because of his shift and unscrupulous habits) has brought about a break in the Mouvement Nationale Congolais. Upon Congo's becoming independent from Belgium on 30 June 1960, he was appointed Premier, while his chief rival (Kasavubu) was made President. It was not long before his erratic behavior aroused opposition and (after getting, in accordance with the Constitution, the necessary Ministerial counter-signatures) Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba from office. Lumumba has not accepted this and has managed to get what amounted to a vote of confidence by the Assembly. However, the confused situation was made even more confused by the fact that this vote was apparently not by a quorum. Lumumba has been accused by many of his compatriots of being a Communist. He denies this. However, until they were forced out of the country following the Colonel Mobutu coup, the Communist bloc were providing increasing numbers of men and material (including transport aircraft and Soviet crews). A letter from the Lumumba regime to the USSR dated 15 August 1960 asked for troops, transport aircraft, transport trucks, weapons, communications equipment, and food supplies. High Lumumba Cabinet posts were given to prominent pro-Communists such as Antoine Gizenga, Vice Premier, and Madame Andree Blouin, Chief of Protocol, who was Gizenga's mistress and at one time had been mistress of President Sekou Toure of Guinea. Even after they were forced out of the country, the Czechs reportedly offered to provide Lumumba with further supplies of arms, and there are indications of their continued clandestine operation in the area.

Guidance

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**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020011-8**

**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020011-8**

10 October 1960

297 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020011-8

With the admission of Nigeria, the UN will have acquired seventeen new members during the current session, sixteen of which are African (the seventeenth is Cyprus) and all of which are former colonies, dependencies or trust territories of Britain (2), France (13), Belgium (1) and Italy (1). This raises African membership to twenty-five, just over 25% of the total membership. Western European membership now constitutes twenty-three, Latin America twenty, Near Eastern six, Asian thirteen, Soviet Bloc nine and others (Cyprus, Israel and Yugoslavia) three. The largest single geographic group in UNGA is the African one. What does this mean for the Western World and particularly for the United States? Is there a solid bloc here that can be counted on to follow a consistent voting pattern and would such a pattern favor the East or the West? On the basis of what we now know, the answer to both questions is "No". Of the twenty-five African members, five are North African and Mohammedan (Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, the United African Republic and Sudan). One is East African (Ethiopia) and in a class by itself. Eighteen of the remainder lie in Equatorial Africa, while the nineteenth (the Malagasy Republic) lies off the Southeast Coast. All nineteen are in a low state of economic development, markedly agricultural, and all have an extremely low standard of living. Administrators, technicians, professional people, are few indeed and not one has anything substantial in the way of a middle class. The entire group can be characterized as being a highly complex linguistic and ethnic intermixture with a social structure that is tribal and highly hierarchical, upon which purely arbitrary political boundaries have been imposed by the accidents of colonial conquest and into which unrelated Western political institutions have been introduced. The ties that bind these national states together are those of skin pigmentation, intense loyalties and hereditary local rule, with rare exceptions. With respect to UNGA voting patterns their links with the rest of the world are tenuous - closest undoubtedly with North Africa, the Near East and South-Southeast Asia, in that order. Here, the cementing force is largely emotional composed of an apparent color bond, religious ties and a shared urge to remain free of involvement in the Cold War. Unquestionably, also, anti-colonialism is a contributing force. Communism is substantially meaningless. The United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China represent successful world powers and little more. It is true that a common front tends to be maintained with North Africa, the Near East and uncommitted Asia. It is also true that in certain issues individual states will tend to support their former rulers. The main determinant is self-interest. Such appeal as Moscow or Peking may have lies in their apparent success in modernization and industrialization in a comparatively short time, their fervant denunciation of colonialism, and their ready offers of aid in various forms. But whatever leanings these new nations may have at home, in the voting in UNGA there is no reason to believe that any of them will display an prediliction to support either the US or the USSR or any other non-African power on any grounds other than those of strict nationalism and self-interest. Much depends upon what the United States and the West can offer and how it is handled.

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10 October 1960

208 22nd CPSU Congress 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020011-8  
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The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which was expected to meet sometime in December, 1960, will probably be postponed but in any event should be convened in January or February 1961. The By-Laws of the CPSU prescribe that a party congress be held every four years: the last regular session, the 20th Congress, was held in February, 1956, but an irregular 21st Congress met in January, 1959 (with another meeting six months later); it was notable that this 21st Congress did not elect a new Central Committee. The 22nd Congress is therefore technically overdue, although the Communists by no means consistently adhere to their own regulations (under Stalin, the 18th met in 1939, the 19th in 1952!). The Congress will undoubtedly be attended by many if not most foreign Communist leaders: it is rumored that a special meeting in advance has been called for November 7th (comparable to the meeting during the 40th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 1957) at which the Sino-Soviet ideological schism will be discussed.

The Congress will presumably deal with at least three major issues:


a. Sino-Soviet relations, either announcing whatever compromise between the two parties may have been reached, or unilaterally asserting the CPSU's hegemony over the World Communist Movement (See Guidance #291, "Sino-Soviet Tensions: Recent Developments");

b. The degree of Khrushchev's control over the CPSU apparatus, presumably most clearly shown in the composition of the new Central Committee, to be elected at the Congress, and in the new Presidium, to be appointed by the new Central Committee from among its members;

c. The CPSU party line on domestic and international affairs, expressed either in the Central Committee's report (traditionally the first item on the Congress agenda) or in separate agenda items, reports or resolutions. Of particular emphasis is likely to be the problem of further economic expansion and development, involving the two problems of channelling the benefits of increased production through party channels and further integration of Bloc economies with the economy of the USSR.

Guidance

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**Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020011-8**

~~SECRET~~ October 1960

299. Hungarian Violations of the 1947 Peace Treaty

Shortly after the close of World War II, the "Allied and Associated Powers" (i. e., the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, the Byelorussian Soviet Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia) concluded treaties of peace with the European Enemy States which (of the countries now dominated by the Soviet Union) included Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Each of these regimes has violated the basic provisions of their respective peace treaties to which both they and the Soviet Union were signatories. In particular, they have violated those sections of the treaties having to do with the "enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting." (Part II, Section I, Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary; Paris, 10 February 1947). They have also violated those sections of the treaties dealing with the limitation of indigenous armed forces. By far the most notorious of these transgressions relates to the "People's Republic of Hungary" in which the usual violations inherent in Communist politics and ethics, as manifested in the regular course of their takeover and consolidation of power in the areas in question, were compounded and exposed for all the world to see during the illegal and brutal repression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the list of broken promises and bloodthirsty reprisals that characterized the post-Revolutionary period. A partial list of source material plus pertinent quotations from the basic treaties are attached to this guidance. It should be noted that the Hungarian Question has been re-inscribed on the agenda of the 15th UNGA.

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10 October 1960

Attachment to Item #299

# I. BASIC DOCUMENTS

1. Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Paris, 10 February 1947.
2. Geneva Conventions, 1949.
3. UN Committee Report on Hungary, 1957.
4. Observations on the Illegality of the KADAR Regime, Free Europe Committee, 1957.
5. United Nations Review, Volume 4, No. 2, August 1957.
6. The Situation in Hungary, a Summary of UN actions from 28 October to 31 December 1956.
7. The Hungarian situation and The Rule of Law; International Commission of Jurists, The Hague, 1957.

## II. GENEVA CONVENTIONS

The obligations relating to fundamental rights which are contained in the Hungarian Peace Treaty are given a more precise form in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which the Soviet Union and Hungary were parties.

It is true that in Convention IV which is concerned with the protection of the civilian population, a distinction is made between a conflict of an international character where the obligations are laid down in greater detail, and an internal conflict. It has been strongly argued, however, that the Soviet action amounted clearly to dictatorial intervention by the armed forces of one State in the internal affairs of another and as such it is without doubt a conflict of an international character.

In the particular circumstances of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, it makes no difference whether action taken against the civilian population is carried out by the Soviet forces themselves or, as appears to be more often the case, by the Hungarian authorities under their control. Article 47 is quite explicit on the point:

"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory."

### Article 68

"The Occupying Power... may impose the death penalty on a protected person only in cases where the person is guilty of espionage, of serious acts of sabotage against the military installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional offences which have caused the death of one or more persons, provided that such offences were punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation began".

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Attachment to Item #299

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Article 71

"No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a regular trial.

"Accused persons who are prosecuted by the Occupying Power shall be promptly informed, in writing, in a language which they understand, of the particulars of the charges preferred against them, and shall be brought to trial as rapidly as possible. The Protecting Power shall be informed of all proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons in respect of charges involving the death penalty or imprisonment for two years or more; it shall be enabled, at any time, to obtain information regarding the state of such proceedings. Furthermore, the Protecting Power shall be entitled, on request, to be furnished with all particulars of these and of any other proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons.

"The notification to the Protecting Power, as provided for in the second paragraph above, shall be sent immediately, and shall in any case reach the Protecting Power three weeks before the date of the first hearing. Unless, at the opening of the trial, evidence is submitted that the provisions of this Article are fully complied with, the trial shall not proceed. The notification shall include the following particulars:

- a) description of the accused;
- b) place of residence or detention;
- c) specification of the charge or charges (with mention of the provisions under which it is brought);
- d) designation of the court which will hear the case;
- e) place and date of the first hearing."

Article 72

"Accused persons shall have the right to present evidence necessary to their defence and may, in particular, call witnesses. They shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate or counsel of their own choice, who shall be able to visit them freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities for preparing the defence.

"Failing a choice by the accused, the Protecting Power may provide him with an advocate or counsel. When an accused person has to meet a serious charge, and the Protecting Power is not functioning, the Occupying Power, subject to the consent of the accused, shall provide an advocate or counsel."

Article 75

\* \* \* \* \*

In the above articles it will have been noted that there are references to the "Protecting Power". Article 11 specifically provides for a situation, which has in fact arisen in Hungary, where neither the Occupying Power or the governmental authorities of the Occupied territory have agreed on or accepted

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Attachment to Item #299

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Protecting Powers. It lays down that if protection cannot be arranged, the occupying power "shall request or shall accept the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to perform the humanitarian functions performed by the Protecting Powers under the present Convention."

Even if the situation in Hungary is regarded as a purely internal conflict a substantial measure of protection is given by Article 3 of Convention IV to persons taking no part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms. It is of particular concern to the International Commission of Jurists to emphasize that this Article specifically prohibits: -

d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilized peoples."

### III. TREATY OF PEACE WITH HUNGARY (Extract) Paris, February 10, 1947.<sup>1</sup>

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Australia, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of South Africa, and the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the States which are at war with Hungary and actively waged war against the European enemy States with substantial military forces, hereinafter referred to as "the Allied and Associated Powers of the one part, and Hungary, of the other part;

Whereas the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary are desirous of concluding a treaty of peace, which, conforming to the principles of justice, will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the events hereinbefore recited and form the basis of friendly relations between them, thereby enabling the Allied and Associated Powers to support Hungary's application to become a member of the United Nations and also to adhere to any Convention concluded under the auspices of the United Nations;

Have therefore agreed to declare the cessation of the state of war and for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty of Peace....

#### Article 2

1. Hungary shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Hungarian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.

2. Hungary further undertakes that the laws in force in Hungary shall not, either in their content or in their application, discriminate or entail any discrimination between persons of Hungarian nationality on the ground of their race, sex, language, or religion, whether in reference to their persons, property, business, professional or financial interests, status, political or civil rights or any other matter.

<sup>1</sup> Department of State. Publication 2743, reprinted in European Peace Treaties After World War II (Boston 1954; Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VIII, IX, Suppl.) pp. 273-297.

Attachment to Item #299

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Article 3

Hungary, which in accordance with the Armistice Agreement has taken measures to set free, irrespective citizenship and nationality, all persons held in confinement on account of their activities in favour of, or because of their sympathies with, the United Nations or because of their racial origin, and to repeal discriminatory legislation and restrictions imposed thereunder, shall complete these measures and shall in future not take any measures or enact any laws which would be incompatible with the purposes set forth in this Article.

Article 22

1. Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, all Allied forces shall, within a period of 90 days, be withdrawn from Hungary, subject to the right of the Soviet Union to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria.

2. All unused Hungarian currency and all Hungarian goods in possession of the Allied forces in Hungary, acquired pursuant to Article 11 of the Armistice Agreement, shall be returned to the Hungarian Government within the same period of 90 days.

3. Hungary shall, however, make available such maintenance and facilities as may specifically be required for the maintenance of the lines of communication with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria, for which due compensation will be made to the Hungarian Government.

Article 40

1. Except where another procedure is specifically provided under any Article of the present Treaty, any dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by direct diplomatic negotiations, shall be referred to the Three Heads of Mission acting under Article 39, except that in this case the Heads of Mission will not be restricted by the time limit provided in that Article. Any such dispute not resolved by them within a period of two months shall, unless the parties to the dispute mutually agree upon another means of settlement, be referred at the request of either party to the dispute to a Commission composed of one representative of each party and a third member selected by mutual agreement of the two parties from nationals of a third country. Should the two parties fail to agree within a period of one month upon the appointment of the third member, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may be requested by either party to make the appointment.

2. The decision of the majority of the members of the Commission shall be the decision of the Commission, and shall be accepted by the parties as definitive and binding.



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Attachment to Item #296

1. Paraphrase Translation of Letter from Chou-En-lai to pro-Communist Gizenga of Lumumba Government.

Chinese People and government support people of the Congo in their fight against aggression and military intervention launched by imperialists headed by the United States under cover of United Nations Flag. Fight of the Congo is grandiose and just. Chinese People have deep sympathy for your fight. Chinese Government condemns energetically the plots which imperialists, headed by the United States are waging against the Congo.

Chinese Government would like very much to do everything possible by offering aid to the GOC. But in the situation in which the Congo now finds itself and fact that China is far from Africa, it is not appropriate for China to send military volunteers to the Congo. Now, the Chinese Government has first decided to give foreign funds--one million pounds sterling for free disposition by the GOC. Concerning other aid the Congo has requested and means of transportation, the Chinese Government is in process of studying these requests and when a decision is taken the Chinese Government will inform you. Signed Chou-En-lai, September 12.

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2. Text of Letter from Nkrumah to Lumumba.

My dear Patrice, enclosed are two releases to gladden your heart in this your dire hour--the first about General Alexander, my Army Chief, and the other my note to the Security Council concerning the diabolical attempt to dethrone you and the lawfully Constituted Government of the Congo of which you are the legal head.

My emissaries Mr. Motsio and Mr. Welbeck returned from Leopoldville yesterday to inform me of what has been happening there. I am sending back Mr. Welbeck with this note regarding the lines to be followed to safeguard your position and save the unity of the Congo.

The first point I would like to bring to your attention again is that considering the fact that you had to form a very wide coalition government and considering the fact that you have the Tshombe problem, the Kalonji problem, the Kasavubu problem and other similar problems so far concealed now, and considering the fact that the colonialists and imperialists are doing their utmost to retrieve their lost ground in the Congo, you cannot afford, my brother, to be harsh and uncompromising. Do not force Kasavubu out now. It will bring too much trouble especially in Leopoldville when you want calm there now. Do not make an issue of his treachery now or even of Tshombe's treachery. The time will come to deal with them.

Let sleeping dogs lie. Leave these people alone now. In the same way, please, do not come out with any new constitution now. It will jeopardise your position. It will give the whip to Tshombe and the separatists to stir up trouble again. Be "as cool as a cucumber", establish the administration and consolidate your position before you take the next step. I would be the last person to advise you to compromise on any matter of principle, but the very critical situation in the Congo demands your adopting what I call "tactical action".

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That is, you should so adopt your methods, without sacrificing any principles, that you work even with your bitterest political enemies in order to give you time to consolidate your position--organizationally, i.e., Governmental and Party, both with regard to the central government as well as in the provinces, before you take the next step.

Allied to this is what I have sent to tell you before and I must repeat with all emphasis here, namely, that you must not push the United Nations troops out until you have consolidated your position, and then you can ask them to leave. I know the difficulties you are having with the United Nations and we are not sparing them at all, as you can find from my enclosed note to the Security Council. But if the United Nations troops move out now, you will not be able to cope with the confusion that will ensue, fomented by the colonial powers, Belgian and other imperialists working with the reactionaries at home.

The third important point is that you must quickly establish your administration so that people may feel secure that get work to do: immigration and customs should also be established immediately at all sea and air ports. Fortunately, the United Nations is there with plenty of funds to help you and you must set up the organization you announced at your press conference two days ago to make use of the aid offered. Get hold of the aid and control it. Whatever the political squabbles with your opponents, the hungry unemployed people will not continue to stand by and go hungry, they will soon act, and will respond to whoever will be able, or even promise, to give them "bread and games", as the ancient Romans put it.

My dear Patrice, the above are my three basic and urgent suggestions; the position is critical, if you act quickly on them, the position will be saved, if you delay, anything may happen. Please, pay heed to my suggestions and tackle the internal situation which you alone can remedy, provided you pay heed to my suggestions.

As regards the external work, especially concerning the Security Council and UNO, leave that to me. You can be sure that on any issue, I shall mobilize the Afro-Asian block and other friendly nations to support you as in the case of the present attempt to dethrone you.

Now, a few other suggestions.

Firstly, your cabinet is too big but it will not be wise to cut it down at this time. In the meantime the best thing is to establish a sort of inner cabinet, called for instance the cabinet committee, to deal with urgent issues. A good excuse for setting it up is the present emergency facing the country, when urgent decisions have to be taken quickly as in war time.

I suggest the membership of this committee as follows:

#### CABINET COMMITTEE:

1. Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs - Chairman. 2. Deputy Premier - Vice Chairman. 3. Minister of the Interior Member. 4. Minister of Local Government - Member. 5. Minister for Technical Assistance - Member. 6. Commander of the Forces - Member. 7, 8, and 9. Three other Ministers - Members.

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CABINET COMMITTEE: Purpose

1. To deal with the emergency.
2. For political, military and airport matters.
3. The Kawanga and Kasai questions.
4. Relations with the United Nations.
5. Technical Assistance - Approval of Policy and Programme.
6. Any urgent business.

You will see that because of the emergency and your having a lot to do with the United Nations and the Security Council, et cetera, I have added Foreign Affairs to your portfolio. But look out for two trusted comrades, one to be Deputy Minister of Defense and the other to be Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, both under you.

You may hold ordinary cabinet meetings with all your Ministers once a week for ordinary government business, but the inner cabinet, i.e., the Cabinet Committee, should meet every day. You should however, keep cabinet informed of decisions taken and executed. Some important matters dealt with by the Cabinet Committee have to be referred to the whole cabinet for approval in order to get the full backing of your ministers.

Your Technical Assistance Committee may be composed as follows:

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE:

1. Deputy Premier - Chairman.
2. Minister for Technical Assistance Member.
3. Minister of Local Government - Member.
4. Minister of Establishment - Member.
5. Member of Labor - Member.
6. Minister of Public Works - Member.
9. Minister of Communications - Member.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE: Purpose

To cooperate with the United Nations and other agencies and countries for the speedy and effective use of any technical assistance offered.

The committee should have weekly joint meetings with United Nations representatives to plan programmes for the approval of cabinet before execution.

The minister for technical assistance, as the Chief Executive for the programme is to be given adequate authority for effective and speedy action within approved policies and programmes.

Now, Patrice, I come to the question of the force publique. I admire them for what they have done and I would not have them disarmed. Their provincial loyalties are too strong and groups of them are inclined to follow ministers from their areas. At the moment, too, you have got to get adequate rations, supplies, etc. Considering also the Kalonji, Kasavubu and other menaces, brother, it is absolutely unsafe to depend entirely upon the force publique at this critical time.

It is imperative to have your officers trained without delay and so let me have your reply to my offer concerning the training of your officers here in my military academy.

Finally, a word from you on the radio calling on all Congolese to bury their differences and come together in the interest of the nation will have an electric effect in bringing the people together and thus establishing your own position and the peace necessary for the development of the Congo. Brother, mark my advice.

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Whenever in doubt consult me. Brother, we have been in the game for sometime now and we know how to handle the imperialists and the colonialists. The only colonialist or imperialist that I trust is a dead one. If you do not want to bring the Congo into ruin, follow the advice I have given you. Brother, have implicit faith in me, I shall not let you down. Your stand for United Congo and for African unity commend you dearly to me. Your friend, M. Djin, is there to help you in every way possible, you cannot have a better admirer and supporter than Djin. Trust him as you did heretofore and he will serve you well.

Patrice, I have surveyed the position in the Congo very, very carefully. If you fail, you have only yourself to blame and it will be due to your unwillingness to face the facts of life or as the Germans called "Real Politique". Your failure will be a great blow to the African Liberation Movement, and you cannot afford to fail. Your policy "to do away with your enemies" now will fail, you must adopt "tactical action". Remember the forces pitched against you are legion. But the odds are in your favour, and you will succeed if only you handle the situation carefully and tactfully.

God bless, Yours Affectionately, Signed Kwame Nkrumah.

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Dear Patrice, thank you for your (letter) which was transmitted to me by Mr. Djin regarding the refusal of my troops to allow you to take over Radio Leopoldville yesterday. It was a regrettable affair, but I believe the troops acted in such a manner because for the time being they are under the authority of the United Nations. I am fed up with the manner the United Nations have been treating you. But, as you are undoubtedly aware, I have taken steps in this matter. I have asked the United Nations to turn over to you the National Broadcasting Station and the airfields. I have also asked the United Nations to recognize you as Prime Minister and as Head of the Government of the Congo. If this is not done I have let it be understood that I shall withdraw my troops from the UN and shall place them at your disposal. At the same time I shall appeal to all the independent states of Africa for them to withdraw their forces and to create a Pan-American high command with a view to bringing assistance to your troops. We are also undertaking a tactical action so that in any case world opinion will support us.

I have asked Mr. Djin and a few of our officers to visit you in order to assure you of my personal feelings in this matter and of their readiness to act on your behalf as soon as I give them the word.

Sincerely yours, Signed Kwame Nkrumah.

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